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Thursday, December 12, 2019

acquitted in cheque bounce case if the plaintiff has no money lending license

The Negotiable Instruments Act defines Law relating to negotiable instruments which are Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange as well as cheques. A cheque is said to be bounced when a check cannot be processed because the account holder has non-sufficient funds. Section 139 of the N.I. Act says that there is assumption in favour of Holder that the cheque holder received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole in part of any debt or other liability.


 

                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                                                  BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.


                                              CRIMINAL APPEAL NO:  467  /2009


                                            Smt.Nanda    w/o   Dharam Nandanwar
                                                                    Vs

                                             Nandkishor s/o Talakram  Thaokar



CORAM:   A.P.BHANGALE, J.

DATED:     12th January, 2010

Citation: 2010(1)Crimes708, 2010(3)MhLj268


This Appeal   at the instance of  original complainant,  is directed  against the  judgment  and order dated 26th March, 2009 passed by  learned  Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur in Criminal Complaint Case  No.9037/2007, whereby the  respondent accused was acquitted of the charge under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881( hereinafter 2. referred to as“the N.I.  Act”).The  facts in nutshell   which gave rise to this appeal are :The complainant claimed that she is carrying on the business in  lending money  to needy  persons.   It is her case  that the accused had approached her on 3.2.2006  and 8.4.2006 with a  request  for loan in the sum of Rs. 18,000/­  and Rs. 19,000/­  respectively for a period  of two months and agreed to pay  interest   at   the   rate   of   Rs.   21%    per   annum,  under   two   promissory   notes executed before a Guarantor and accepted the cash. Further, according to  the complainant, the accused had on 17.11.2006   issued   a cheque in the  sum of Rs. 40,000/­   towards repayment of loan amount and part of interest. 



The cheque bearing No. 76778  was drawn upon Canara Bank, Sadar Bazar   Nagpur. The cheque was presented by the complainant on  4.5.2007  to the State Bank of Indore, Gandhibagh, Nagpur, which came to 
be dishonoured with remarks  “funds insufficient”   as informed by the Bank, on   5.5.2007.  The complainant   by notice dated 21.5.2007 demanded a sum of Rs. 40,000/­ and interest at the rate of  21 per cent within 15 days of the receipt of notice. The accused  received the notice on 22.5.2007;   but did   not   repay   the   amount.   Hence   the   complainant   filed   complaint  on 26.6.2007  in the Court of learned  Judicial Magistrate, First Class­2, Nagpur seeking   trial and punishment of the   accused for offence punishable under 
section 138 of the   N.I.  Act.



3.The     accused   did   not   dispute   the   fact   that     he   had   issued   the cheque   under   his   signature   and     had     received   notice  (Exh.22)    from  the complainant;  but out rightly  denied the complaint  and  any liability  on the ground that the complainant was doing business of money lending   without any requisite  licence for money lending and that the complainant has failed to prove legally  enforceable  or recoverable debt  or legal liability  as against accused,   in view of the  provisions of  the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. The   accused   opposed   the   complaint     stoutly   on   the   ground   that        under  section 139   of the N.I. Act, there cannot be   presumption   of pre-existing liability  and complainant  had  failed  to prove that the   cheque was issued towards legally enforceable  debt  or liability.



4.The     trial   Court,   after   considering   the   evidence   led   and  submissios  at the Bar,   recorded finding of  “not guilty”  and  acquitted the accused of the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I.  Act.



5. Learned   Advocate for the appellant,   in support of the appeal, submitted that the accused ought to have been convicted by the trial Court for offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I.  Act, since the accused had admitted   issuance   of   cheque   under his signature, which   was   returned dishonoured  and  remained   unpaid. It is further   contended that the complainant was not bound   to produce money lending  license in operation. Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that  the accused ought to have  been held guilty. According to  learned Advocate for the  appellant,  mere non­production of money  lending license in the trial Court,  was  cited   as the  prime  reason for  acquitting    the accused and, therefore, judgment and  None appeared for the respondent  at the time of hearing of this 



6.order impugned,   be set aside. Appeal.

7. In  Krishna  Janardhan Bhat    vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde :   AIR  2008   SC  1325,      the Apex Court in Para No.20 observed that sec.138 of  the N.I.  Act has three ingredients, viz:ig

(iii)that  there is  a legally enforceable debt; that the cheque was drawn from the account of  bank  for discharge in whole  or in part of any  debt or other liability which presupposes   legally enforceable  debt ; and,that the cheque   so issued had been  returned due to insufficiency of funds.(I)

(ii)It is further observed in Para  No. 21  while considering presumption u/s 139 of the N.I.  Act;“Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption in favor of the holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability” In order to prove offense punishable under sec. 138 of the said Act, five ingredients are required   to be proved as laid down by the Apex Court in   Paragraph No. 10    in   Kusum Ignotes and Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar  Peterson Securities Ltd.:  (2002 ) 2 SCC   745.    


They are  as follows :­“

(i)A   person   must   have   drawn     a   cheque   on   an  account  maintained     by him in a  Bank  for   payment     of  certain amount of money to another person from   out of  that account for the discharge   of any legally   enforceable 


(ii) debt   or other liability. that  cheque   has been presented to the  Bank within a period of six months   from the date on which it is  drawn   or   within   the   period     of   its   validity,   whichever   is  earlier;

(iii) that   cheque   is   returned   by   the   Bank   unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds  the  amount arranged to   be   paid from   that 

(iv) account by an agreement made with the Bank;the payee or the holder in due     course of the cheque makes a   demand   for the payment of the said  amount of money by giving a notice   in   writing   to   the 
drawer of the cheque within 15 days  of the receipt of the information by him  from the Bank regarding return of the cheque  as unpaid.

(v)the   drawer     of     such   cheque   fails     to   make  payment of the  said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 30 days   of the  receipt of such  notice.” Under  section  139 of the N.I.  Act,  there is presumption  in favour of holder  that the holder  of a cheque  received the cheque   of the nature referred to in section 138  for the discharge,  in whole in  part of any debt or other liability.  The explanation to section 138   makes it clear that “debt or other liability” means legally enforceable  debt or other liability.   Under section 118  of the  N.I.   Act it can legally be   inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for  Thus, bearing in mind  the  relevant   provisions of the N.I.  Act, it 



8. Consideration on the date which the cheque  bears. must be emphasized that only legally enforceable  debt or liability can be enforced in the proceedings under section 138 of the said Act, because the  explanation to the penal provision is abundantly clear that the dishonoured cheque must have   been received by the complainant against  a legally. The  complainant in the present case,  is a money lender who had 


9.enforceable  debt or liability. advanced loan to the accused on the basis of the two promissory notes  dated 3.2.2006         and 8.4.2006   respectively     for loan of Rs. 18,000/­ and Rs. 19,000/­ respectively,    at interest at the rate of  21 per cent per annum. It is thus case of the complainant  that the accused had issued cheque No. 767789 drawn upon Canara Bank, Sadar  Bazar, Nagpur  for Rs. 40,000/­  towards repayment   of loan amount and interest.

Thus,   it   was incumbent  upon the complainant  to establish  the fact that she held valid money lending license in accordance with the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 for the relevant period   of the transaction. The complainant –money lender  did not   produce such a valid money lending license at the time when complaint     was   instituted     nor     till   it   is   decided   although     required.  Furthermore, no  such valid money lender's license  is produced even during pendency of this Appeal. Section 10   of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946   runs thus:
No  Court shall pass decree in favour  of money 10(1)lender  in any suit  to which this  Act applies  including  such suit pending in the Court before  the commencement  of  the   Bombay   Money   Lenders  (Amendment  ) Act, 1975 unless the Court is satisfied  that  at the time  when loan  or  any part thereof   to which the suit relates   was advanced 
the money lender held  a valid license  and if the Court is satisfied, the money lender did not hold   a valid license, it shall dismiss  the suit.

The words “No court”    and “in any suit”   used in the Section are wider in scope to embrace any suit or proceeding initiated by a money lender who is  required to hold  and prove valid license  for money lending for the  relevant  period of the loan transaction or   transactions. The trial Court was, therefore, entitled to insist upon the complainant for production of valid  license for money lending  and also  to infer   in  view of Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the document withheld     was   unfavourable     to   the  complainant who withheld it. Thus, the legal position cannot be  disputed that Courts  are bound to dismiss the suit by money lender      for recovery of loans when such money lender was found carrying         on business of money lending on the  date or dates of the transaction  without having  valid money lending   license. The Court, in view of Sec.10(1)   of   the   Bombay   Money Lenders Act, 1946  is  bound to dismiss the suit instituted without production  of  valid money lending license operative at the time of suit loan  transactions.

In other words, a money lender cannot enforce such loan transaction lawfully without  production   of valid   money lending license  operative at the time  of  transaction of loan to be recovered. Thus, no fault can  be found with  the trial Court as it was   duty   bound   to   dismiss   the  complaint by the  complainant a money lender who was  engaged in business of money lending without  a   valid money  lending  license at  the time of  transaction   in view of clear provisions of Sec. 10 of the  Bombay Lenders Act, 1946 as   the learned Court could not have assisted the complainant   to facilitate or further the illegal claim or   claim prohibited  by law in the  complaint. Since explanation  to Sec. 138 of the  N.I.  Act clearly stipulated that the debt or  liability  means legally enforceable    debt or other liability the claim by money lender against her borrower without production of   valid  and operative money lending  license covering period of transaction   was  unenforceable  claim under  section 138  of the  N.I.  Act was  bound  to  be dismissed.

The   complainant     money­lender   despite   availing   of   sufficient  opportunity  in the trial Court could not produce valid  and operative money  lending license at   the time of transaction of loan, hence dismissal   of  complaint cannot   be faulted as the complainant failed to establish legally  enforceable    debt or  liability of the accused.    Sec. 5 of the Bombay Money  Lenders Act prohibits     business of money lending except in accordance with  terms and conditions of money lending license. In the present case, it   was claimed that the     loans   were advanced at interest on the basis of   two  promissory  notes executed in front  of a  guarantor.  


Thus, when transaction  of money  lending without valid license was prohibited by law,  no court can  help or assist  a party money lender to enforce or recover     a claim,  except in  accordance with law i.e. the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 in this case.  The  complainant   withheld important document without any explanation; hence presumption arose  against  the complainant in view of Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act for non ­production of license.

  Learned Advocate for the  appellant   made  a  reference to ruling in Rajesh Varma vs. Aminexs  Holdings and Investments  and others :  2008   (3) Mah.L.J.   460    to  submit that  every loan is not covered by the provisions of the Act inasmuch as section 2 (g)  expressly excluded advance   of any sum    exceeding Rs. 3000/­  made on the basis of   negotiable instrument   other than a promissory note.  In the  case in hand,   the money lender had advanced loans  at interest  on the basis of two promissory notes hence the ruling  cited cannot be come to the rescue of the complainant in the facts and circumstances of the present case  as the complainant could   not establish legally enforceable debt  or liability from  the accused towards complainant.

Since the complainant has failed to establish salutory  or basic ingredients  of offence punishable under sec. 138  of the said Act  or observed in  Kusum Ingots 's case ( supra ), the   complaint  was  rightly dismissed and the finding as   to acquittal   was correct and  logical  by the trial Court.   No ground is made out so as to   interfere in this Appeal.  The acquittal of the  accused is  justified, as the  cheque in   question was, in fact,  had not been issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability  in view of the  provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. 


 10 .invalid     without   licence.       According   to   law   of     Contract,   it   would   not   be possible to enforce   any agreement or consideration,   the object of which is unlawful,   within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which is couched in the  following terms :­What  considerations and objects are “23.unlawful, and what not The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful,   unless ­it is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the   provisions of   any law;   or   is  fraudulent; or
involves   or implies,   injury to the person or  property  of another; or the Court  regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each   of these cases, the consideration or  object of an agreement is said to be unlawful, Every   agreement  of   which   the   object   or  consideration is unlawful, is void.” Thus,   pithily put,   the  transaction in question, is also hit by the 
provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.



11. Hence this   Court is of the considered view that   the complainant could not establish her case against the accused  so as  to bring home the  guilt  on the part of the accused.  The cheque in question was not issued to discharge loan enforceable   according to law and, therefore, notwithstanding     that it 
was dishonoured by non­ payment  of loan remaining unpaid despite demand notice in writing, it cannot  came within the purview of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.   As such, it would  not be possible for this Court  to reverse the acquittal and to fasten criminal liability upon the accused, under section 138 of the N.I. 



Act.  The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.




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