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Thursday, September 28, 2017

Guidelines of Bombay high court for disposal for motor accident claim petition

Guidelines of Bombay high court for disposal for motor accident claim petition

In view of discussion made above, we pass the following order:-
(i)The state government shall issue a direction to all the concerned
officers of the Motor Vehicles Department to scrupulouslyimplement sub-Rule (2) of Rule 251 of the Maharashtra Rules bysubmitting reports in form R.A.R. The State Government shalltake appropriate decision on the issue of uploading the said formson a website;
(ii)The Director General of Police shall issue instructions to all thePolice Stations in the State to scrupulously follow and implementthe provisions of sub-Rules (6) and (8) of Rule 254 of theMaharashtra Rule read with Section 160 of the M.V.Act. The StateGovernment shall issue a direction for uploading form Comp.AAon either a dedicated website or on its existing website by making aprovision for Police Station wise and date wise search. The StateGovernment shall consider of amending the sub-Rule (8) of Rule
254 for making a provision for submitting information as regardsall the accidents involving bodily injury;
(iii)We hold that the Tribunals are not entitled to insist on personalpresence of the applicants at the time of filing of the claimpetitions;
(iv)Subject to what is observed above, the Tribunals shall not refuse
to accept the filing of the claim petitions on the ground that thedocuments as provided in Rules 254 to 255-A of the Maharashtra
Rules are not filed along with the claim petitions. However,compliance with Rule 256 is mandatory. But attestation by the
Advocate for the applicants onphotographs will be mandatoryprovided the claim petition is either filed or sent by post by an
Advocate;
(iv)We hold that in a given case, on an application made by the
applicant or applicants, or suo motu, the Tribunal can issue a
direction to the Officer In-charge of any Police Station to furnish
information directly to the Tribunal in accordance with Sub-Rule 6
of Rule 254. The Tribunal, in a give case can always issue a
direction to furnish a copy of form Comp.AA. The Tribunal can
also issue a direction to the concerned Officer to produce form
R.A.R. In view of clause (b) of Rule 276 of the Maharashtra Rules,
the Tribunal can exercise the power under Order XVI of the Codeof Civil Procedure, 1908 by issuing a summons to produce the
aforesaid documents. The said power can be exercised at any stage
of the claim petitions. In fact, such a direction can be given by the
Tribunal on its own to ensure that the claim petitions under Section
140 or 163-A are disposed of within the time specified under SubRule
3 of both the Rules 255 and 255-A.
(v)We strongly recommend to the State Government to repeal Rule
263 of Maharashtra Rules which requires payment of process fees
on claim petitions. If Rule 263 is not repealed, it may expose itself
to the vice of being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, the State Government shall take
necessary action in accordance with law;
(vi)The directions issued in the decision of this Court in the case of
Anish Kondra continue to bind all the Tribunals. In addition, If the
address of the owner or driver of the offending vehicle or the
insurer of the vehicle is of a place which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, ordinarily, the notice shall be issued
simultaneously through Bailiff and by R.P.A.D or Speed Post to
facilitate early service.
(vii) It will be appropriate if the State Government amends the
Maharashtra Rules to facilitate service of notice through Courier
service as provided in sub-Rule(3) of Rule 9 of Order V of the
Code of Civil Procedure,1908;
(viii)There is no prohibition on recording the evidence of the
medical practitioner or for that matter other witnesses including
claimants through video conferencing or if video conferencing is
not available, through applications providing for video chat
services. The Tribunals are well advised to take recourse to such
method for recording the evidence of the Medical Practitioners or
other experts. If the evidence of the Medical Practitioners is
recorded in such a manner, their time will not be wasted. The
Registry may consider of issuing a Circular on the administrativeside in this behalf.
(ix)If the Registrar General of this Court has not issued instructions
to all the Tribunals in the State in terms of the directions issued by
the Apex Court in the case of Jai Prakash and the directions issued
by this Court in the case of Amish Kondra, he shall do so in
addition to the directions which are required to be issued in terms of
this decision.
(x)All the aforesaid directions shall be complied with within a
period of three months from today.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.128 OF 2004
Anil Prabhakar Tadkalkar
vs.
State of Maharashtra

CORAM : A.S.OKA & R.D.DHANUKA, JJ.
Dated:DECEMBER 21 ,2016

FACTUAL CONTROVERSY
1 By this Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner has raised several issues
concerning the disposal of claim petitions under of the Motor Vehicles
Act,1988 (for short “M.V.Act”) by the Motor Accidents Tribunals in the State.
2 The petitioner is a practicing Advocate. It is his case that he is
practicing as an Advocate since 31st January 1986. It is pointed out in the
petition that the members of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in the State
established under the M.V.Act (for short “the Tribunal” or the Tribunals”)
insist on personal appearance of the claimants at the time of filing of the claim
petitions under Sections 140,163-A, and 166 of the M.V.Act. It is pointed out
that the Tribunal at Pune insists upon the production of form Comp.AA to be
furnished by the claimants/applicants before the notices are issued on the

claim petitions. The attention of the Court is invited to Rule 254 of the
Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules. Attention is also invited to the provisions
of sub-Rule 8 of Rule 254. Attention of the Court is also invited to various
difficulties faced in procuring medical certificates certifying the percentage of
disability. The petitioner has contended that the learned Members of the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are not abiding by several provisions of the
M.V.Act as well as the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules,1989 (for short
`Maharashtra Rules'). Amended prayer clause (a) made in this petition reads
thus:
“(a) The Hon'ble High Court be pleased to issue a Writ of
Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ or Order or direction,
directing the Learned Members of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal:
(i) not to insist upon presence of Claimants for filing an
Application as under Rule 254 (2);
(ii) Police Authority be directed to follow Rule 254(8)
scrupulously about From Comp AA and the office of the Tribunal
be directed to follow Rule 253 C;
(iii) not to insist upon filing of true copies of Form Comp AA as
Rule 253(C) casts duty upon Tribunal to furnish ones;
(iv) not to insist upon Disability Certificate from first hospital
only;
(v) to repeat directions of this High Court in respect of Rule 255
(3) and 260 (3);
(vi) to pass order u/s 140 within 45 days
(vii) Not to make such administrative Rules which defeat are
contra to spirit and letter of Section 144 of M.V.Act.”
3 Shri Ramesh Shinde the Deputy Secretary of Government of
Maharashtra has filed a reply dated 27th January 2005 on behalf of the State
Government. It is contended that the presence of the claimant/applicant is not

mandatory at the time of filing of the claim petitions. There is another affidavit
filed by the same Officer on 8th February 2005. It is contended that the
directions have been issued by a letter dated 14th August 1996 to the Director
General of Police and also to the Police Commissioners as well as the District
Police Superintendents in the State to ensure that form Comp.AA is provided.
4 There is an affidavit filed on 1st March 2005 by the then Registrar
(Legal) of this Court. It is contended therein that an Advocate cannot appear in
a claim petition as a matter of right. It is contended that the Members of the
Tribunal at Pune have not insisted upon production of disability certificate.
There is a rejoinder filed by the petitioner inviting attention of the Court to
various instances of the cases for showing as to how the cases are being dealt
with by the Members of the Tribunal.
SUBMISSIONS
5 The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to various
provisions of the M.V.Act as well as the Maharashtra Rules. He invited our
attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jai Prakash vs.
National Insurance Company and others1
. He relied upon the directions issued
under the said Judgment. He also relied upon the decision of a Division
Bench of this Court in case the Amish Ravindra Kondra vs. Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, Mumbai and another2
. He invited the attention of the Court
to the the observations made in the said decision as well as the directions
issued in paragraph 11 of the said decision. The learned counsel for the High
Court Administration has also assisted the Court by pointing out several
provisions of the Maharashtra Rules. We have also heard the learned AGP for
State.
PROVISIONS OF M.V.ACT
6 Section 165 of the M.V Act provides for constituting the Motor
Accidents Tribunals which reads thus:
1 (2010)2SCC 607
2 2002 ACJ 1755

“165. Claims Tribunals.
1. A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one
or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to
as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the
purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents
involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of
motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.
Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression
"claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury
to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" includes claims for compensation
under Section 140.
2. A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State
Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more
members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof.
3. A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims
Tribunal unless he--
a. Is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or
b. Is, or has been, a District Judge, or
c. Is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court.
4. Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State
Government, may by general or special order, regulate the distribution of
business among them.”
7 Essentially, there are three categories of claim petitions which can be
filed under the provisions of M.V.Act. The first category is of the petitions
under Section 140 which are popularly known as claim petitions filed on the
ground of “No Fault Liability”.
Section 140 reads thus:
“140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle
of no fault.—
(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has
resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle
or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case
may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be
liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement
in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under subSection
(1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed
sum of 1[fifty] thousand rupees and the amount of compensation

payable under that sub-Section in respect of the permanent
disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of 2[twenty-five]
thousand rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under sub-Section (1), the
claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death
or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been
made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner
or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other
person.
(4) A claim for compensation under sub-Section (1) shall not be
defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the
person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the
claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation
recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be
reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the
responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.
[(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Section (2)
regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner
of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also
liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being
in force:
Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under
any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation
payable under this Section or under Section 163-A.]”
8 The second category of petitions is under Section 163-A of the M.V.Act
which are known as the petitions invoking “structured formula”. Section 163-
A reads thus:
“163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on
structured formula basis.
“163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on
structured formula basis.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force
or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor
vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of
death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the
use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second
Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-Section, “permanent
disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).
(2) In any claim for compensation under sub-Section (1), the
claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or
permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made
was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of
the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living
by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the
Second Schedule.”
9 The third category is of regular claim petitions under Section 166 of the
M.V.Act. The relevant provisions dealing with the said category of petitions
are Sections 166 to 168 which read thus:
“166. Application for compensation.—
(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of
the nature specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 165 may be made

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the
legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any
of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased
have not joined in any such application for compensation, the
application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the
legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives
who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the
application.
1[(2) Every application under sub-Section (1) shall be made, at the
option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having
jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the
Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form
and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:

Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140
is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate
statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the
applicant.]
(3) [* * *]
3[(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents
forwarded to it under sub-Section (6) of Section 158 as an
application for compensation under this Act.]”
[Sub-Section (4) was substituted by Act 54 of 1994, S. 53 (w.e.f. 14-11-
1994). Before substitution, sub-Section (4) read :
“(4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an
accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if
it thinks necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for
compensation under this Act.]
167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, (8 of 1923.) where the death of, or bodily injury
to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act
and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person
entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of
Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but
not under both.
168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.
1. On receipt of an application for compensation made under
Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of
the application to the insurer and after giving the parties
(including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an
inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the
claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may
make an award determining the amount of compensation
which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or
persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making
the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount
which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the
vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as
the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for
compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or

permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other
claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for
compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement
shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter
X.
2. The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the
award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case
within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
3. When an award is made under this Section, the person who
is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall,
within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the
Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such
manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.”

CONSIDERATION OF THE MAHARASHTRA RULES
10 Now, we deal with the provisions of the Maharashtra Rules.
Rule 253 reads thus:
“253. Information to be furnished to Insurance Company by Claimants.-
(a) The Regional Transport Officer shall comply with the requisition from the
concerned Divisional Manager, in respect of any motor vehicle involved in an
accident.
(b) On receipt of a requisition in Form “Comp AAA" of the First Schedule
from a Divisional Manager of an Insurance Company with which a motor
vehicle involved in an accident may be insured, the Regional Transport
Officer, to whom it may be addressed shall return the same form, duly filled
in, in duplicate; within 2 weeks from its receipt.
(c) The Office of the Tribunal shall make available to any applicant on
payment of the scheduled charges, a certified copy of the Form ‘Comp
AA’ of the First Schedule required by him. as mentioned in Rule 254(8)
and such of the information as may be contained in it may be used as
genuine and authentic, by any claimant, for the grant of compensation,
on any account.”
(emphasis added)
Rule 254 reads thus:
“254. Application for compensation arising out of an accident.- (l) An
application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified
under this Act shall be made to the Claims Tribunal, having jurisdiction over
the area in which the accident occurred, which shall be in Form ‘COMP’ of
the First Schedule to these Rules with particulars specified in that form.
(2) Every such application shall be sent to the said Claims Tribunal or to the
Chairman, in case the Tribunal consists of more than one member, by
registered post or may be presented to such Claims Tribunal and shall, unless

the Claims Tribunal or its Chairman otherwise directs, be made in duplicate
and shall be signed by the applicant.
(3) In case the Tribunal consists of more than one member, the State
Government shall designate one of them as the Chairman of the Tribunal.
(4) The Chairman of the Tribunal shall have power to transfer any claim
petition from the file of any member to the file of any other member.
(5) There shall be appended to every such application, the following
documents, namely :-
i. injury certificate or in case of death. post-mortem report, or Death
Certificate;
ii. True copy of First information Report or Police Station Diary Entry
or Traffic Accident Report duly certified by the Police Officer of the Police
Station concerned. in respect of the accident; and
iii. Certified copy of the Form Comp ‘AA’ of the First Schedule
mentioned in sub-Rule (8) of this Rule.
iv. If the accident has occurred out of the jurisdiction of the Claims
Tribunal and the claimant has opted to file the application for compensation
before the Claims Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or
carries on business or the claimant has opted to file the application for
compensation before the Claims Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the
defendant resides. a document showing that the defendant resides within the
local limits of jurisdiction of the said Tribunal.
(6) The Officer-in-charge of the Police Station shall. on demand by a person
who wishes to make an application for compensation and who is involved in
an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or the legal successor of
the deceased, shall furnish to him such information and particulars mentioned
under Section 160 and within 15 days from the date of such demand.
(7) If any of the documents specified in sub-Rule (5) are not appended to
the application the reasons for not appending them shall be stated, and if
the Tribunal is satisfied. it may proceed with the application, and require
production thereof at a later stage.
(8) The police station concerned, within whose jurisdiction the accident
for any motor vehicle occurs shall submit a detailed report regarding an
accident to a Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area under
Section 166(4) of the Act and obtain an acknowledgement for it. The
information shall be submitted by the Police Station in Form Comp AA
within one month from the date of accident. Such information shall be
submitted only in respect of accidents which are of fatal or serious in
nature.
(9) True copies of the annexures referred to in sub-Rule (5) shall also be
attached to the copies of the main application to be served on the opposite
parties and the Insurance.”
(emphasis added)
1.
Clause(c) of Rule 253 provides that an Officer of the Tribunal shall

make available to any applicant on payment of scheduled charges a
certified copy of form Comp. AA of the first schedule required by him
for the purpose of filing the claim petition.
11 We have perused the form Comp.AA. It is a form of report about the
motor vehicle accidents. The form contains particulars such as the name of
the police station, C.R.No. and date, time and place of the accident, number of
vehicles and type of vehicles involved in the accident, names and addresses of
the owners of the vehicles, the names and addresses of the drivers of the
vehicles, the details of the insurance policies of the vehicles. Below the form,
a note has been appended stating that the form should accompany copies of (i)
FIR, (ii) Panchanama, and (iii) Medical certificate/ Post Mortem Report. SubRule
8 of Rule 254 provides that the Police Station within whose jurisdiction
the accident of any vehicle has occurred shall submit a detailed report
regarding accidents to Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over an area under
sub-Section 4 of Section 166 of the M.V.Act and obtain acknowledgment for
it. Information is required to be submitted by the Police Station in form
Comp.AA within a period of one month from the date of accident. It is
provided that the said information shall be submitted only in respect of the
accidents which are fatal or of serious nature. Object of sub-Rule 8 of Rule
254 appears to be that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction
over the area in which accident has occurred should get detailed information
about the accident which can be made available to the claimant so that the
claimant is not required to run from pillar to post for getting the requisite
information. In fact clause (c ) of Rule 253 lays down that the Officer of the
Tribunal is under an obligation to make available to the applicant in a claim
petition, a certified copy of form Comp.AA. Perusal of the form Comp.AA
shows that the information required to be set out therein is essential for filing
claim petition. This requirement of sub-Rule (8) of Rule 254 is in terms of
sub-Section (6) of Section 158 of the M.V.Act which reads thus:
“(6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or

bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this Section is completed
by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a
copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information
or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal
having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a
copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt
of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer.”
12 As far as the information regarding the accidents is concerned, even
Rule 251 is relevant which reads thus:
“251. Inspection of vehicle Involved in an accident.— '
( 1) Any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department, not below the rank of
an Inspector of Motor Vehicles, shall inspect the motor vehicle involved
in an accident and for that purpose may enter at any reasonable time any
premises where the vehicle may be and may remove the vehicle for
inspection.
(2) The Officer empowered under sub-Rule (1) shall, submit his
report to the Transport Commissioner, the District Magistrate and
Superintendent of Police, Commissioner of Police concerned and the
Director General of Police, Maharashtra State in Form R.A.R. of
the-First Schedule.)”
(emphasis added)
13 We have perused the form R.A.R. It contains very detailed information
about the accident. It provides for a sketch of accident, the details of the
accident such of the details of the vehicles involved and the victims, the
condition of the road at the spot of accident etc. The information in form
R.A.R is so exhaustive that the State Government should consider of
forwarding R.A.R form to the concerned Tribunals. 11. It is an accepted fact
there is hardly any implementation of Sub-Rule 8 of Rule 254. We may note
here that the said Rule has been enacted before the 1994 amendment to
Section 166 of the M.V.Act which now provides that it is not necessary to file
the claim petition within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal where the accident
has occurred. In fact choice of forum has been provided to the applicants.

Therefore, Sub-Rule 8 of Rule 254 needs modification. Moreover, Sub-Rule 8
of Rule 254 does not provide that the form Comp.AA is required to be issued
in case of all the accidents involving the bodily injury.
14 In our view, the State Legislature should step in by providing that the
information in Form Comp.AA shall be furnished by the Police Stations in the
case of not only fatal or serious accidents but of all the accidents where
injuries are caused to the concerned person/persons. In view of the
amendment to Section 166, only way by which information can be made
available in the form of Comp.AA to all the Tribunals where claim petitions
could be filed, is to ensure that the same is uploaded together with all its
accompaniments such as copy of FIR on a dedicated website or the website of
the Transport Department within a specified time. For making this provision,
it is not necessary to wait till an amendment is made to the Maharashtra Rules
and therefore, we propose to issue necessary directions in that behalf. The
State Government should consider of uploading form R.A.R along with
Comp.AA form. The Rules can be amended to provide that production of a
print out of a downloaded form Comp.AA with the claim petition will be
treated as a sufficient compliance. In fact, we may note here that clause (iv) of
Sub-Rule 5 of Rule 254 was incorporated on 16th August 1996 after the
amendment of the M.V.Act was made. At that stage, an amendment of the
Maharashtra Rules could have been made for giving effect to amended subSection
(2) of Section 166.
REQUIREMENT OF THE PERSONAL PRESENCE OF THE CLAIMANTS
AT THE TIME OF FILING CLAIM PETITIONS AND REPRESENTATION
OF THE CLAIMANTS BY ADVOCATES
15 Rule 256 provides that while filing the petitions covered by Rules 254
(under Section 166 of the M.V.Act), 255 (under Section 140 of the M.V.Act)
and 255-A (under Section 163-A of the M.V.Act), the applicant must produce
his recent passport size photograph which is required to be either affixed to the

claim petition or affixed on a separate sheet of paper annexed to the claim
petition. Rule 258 confers power on the Tribunal to examine the applicant on
oath as provided therein. Rule 264 provides that the Claims Tribunal may, in
its discretion, allow any party to appear through a legal practitioner. SubRule
2 of Rule 254 provides that every application under Section 254 shall be
sent to the Claims Tribunal by registered post or may be presented to such
Claims Tribunal. On perusal of the Rules in Chapter IX of the Maharashtra
Rules, we find that there is no requirement of the applicant or applicants
personally remaining present in the office of the Tribunal at the time of
presenting claim petitions under any of the three Sections. The requirement of
affixing photograph as provided in Rule 256 is mandatory, but the requirement
of the Advocate signing or attesting photograph will become mandatory only
in those cases where at the time of filing the claim petitions, the Tribunal
grants permission to an Advocate to represent the applicant or applicants in
accordance with Rule 264.
16 If applicant wants to engage an Advocate, at the time of filing the claim
petition itself, the claim petition shall be accompanied by an application in
writing to that effect signed by the applicant . At the time of presentation of
the claim petition, the Registrar of the Tribunal or the Administrative incharge
of the office of the Tribunal shall place the application before the
learned Member of the Tribunal who is required to pass appropriate order
thereon immediately. If the Tribunal refuses permission to engage an
Advocate, notwithstanding the said order, filing of the claim petition should be
accepted and the office of the Tribunal shall intimate the applicant regarding
the refusal of the Tribunal to grant permission to engage the Advocate. We
may note here in many cases, the Tribunal may need assistance of a Member
of the Bar for effectively disposing of the cases. Therefore, in a normal
course, when a permission under Section 264 is sought, the Tribunal should
grant permission to engage an Advocate and the refusal should be only in
exceptional cases.

17 If a petition is received through registered post or is filed by the the
Advocate in absence of the applicant or applicants and if the Claims Tribunal
entertains any doubt about the genuineness of the applicant or applicants, it
can always exercise the power of enforcing the personal presence of the
applicant or applicants as the case may be. In view of the power conferred on
the Tribunal by Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 276, in a given case, the Tribunal can take
recourse to the examination of the applicant or applicants under Rule 258
after issuing a notice for enforcing their presence.

FURNISHING THE DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE
ACCIDENTS WITH ALL PARTICULARS
18 Rules 254, 255 and 255-A lay down what documents should be
appended to the claim petitions under Sections 140, 163-A and 166 of the
M.V.Act. As regards form Comp. AA, as noted earlier, we propose to issue
necessary directions. Sub-Rule 6 of Rule 254 provides that every Officer Incharge
of a Police Station is under a mandate to furnish information to a
person who wishes to make an application for grant of compensation. The
mandate is to provide information to such persons as mentioned in Section
160 within a period of 15 days of the demand. Section 160 of the M.V.Act
reads thus:
160. Duty to furnish particulars of vehicle involved in accident.
A registering authority or the officer in charge of a police station shall, if so required by
a person who alleges that he is entitled to claim compensation in respect of an accident
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, or if so required by an insurer against whom a
claim has been made in respect of any motor vehicle, furnish to that person or to that
insurer, as the case may be, on payment of the prescribed fee any information at the
disposal of the said authority or the said authority or the said police officer relating to
the identification marks and other particulars of the vehicle and the name and address of
the person who was using the vehicle at the time of the accident or was injured by it and
the property, if any damaged in such form and within such time as the Central
Government may prescribe.
19 We propose to issue necessary directions to the State to ensure that the
Officers in-charge of each police station strictly comply with Sub-Rules 6 and
8 of Rule 254. In a given case, on an application made by the applicant or

applicants, the Claims Tribunal can issue a direction to the Officer In-charge
of any Police Station to furnish information directly to the Tribunal in
accordance with Sub-Rule 6 of Rule 254. The Tribunal, in a given case can
issue a direction to furnish a copy of form Comp.AA. In view of clause (b) of
Rule 276 of the Maharashtra Rules, the Tribunal can exercise the said power
under Order XVI by issuing summons to produce the documents. The said
power can be exercised at any stage of the claim petitions. In fact, such a
direction can be also issued by the Tribunal on its own to ensure that the claim
petitions under Section 140 or 163-A are disposed of within the time specified
under Sub-Rule 3 of both the Rules 255 and 255-A.
EFFECT OF THE NON PRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENTS
20 Sub Rule 7 of Rule 254 makes it very clear that the Claim petition
under Section 166 of the M.V.Act is not rendered per se illegal or invalid if the
documents set out under sub-Rule (5) of Rule 254 are not appended to the
claim petitions or not produced with the claim petitions. The same is the case
with the claim petitions under Sections 140 and 163-A. The relevant subRules
grant power to the Tribunal to proceed with the applications, if the
reasons for not appending the necessary documents are stated in the Claim
Applications. Thus, the Tribunal cannot refuse to accept the filing of the
claim petitions on the ground that the necessary documents are not filed.
21 In a given case, if the Tribunal is satisfied on the basis of of the
available documents that a case is made out for grant of compensation, it can
always proceed to decide the Claim Petition in accordance with law
notwithstanding the fact set out in Rule 254, 255 and 255-A are not appended
to the Claim Petition.
SERVICE OF NOTICES
22 Now, coming to the service of notices on claim petitions, Rule 263
provides for payment process fees. In the State of Maharashtra, now the

payment of process fees in this Court as well as Civil Courts has been
abolished by virtue of the Bombay High Court Process Fees Repeal Rules,
2014. We, therefore, strongly recommend to the State Government to repeal
Rule 263 which requires payment of process fees. If Rule 263 is not repealed,
it may expose itself to the vice of being discriminatory and in breach of Article
14 of the Constitution of India. We propose to direct the State Government to
initiate appropriate action in this behalf. Moreover, the disposal of the claim
petitions is delayed in many cases as process fee is not paid within the
stipulated time.
23 We have perused the decision of a Division Bench in the case of Amish
Kondra. In paragraph 11 of the Judgment the Division Bench has issued
following directions:
11.In the circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the following
directions will serve the ends of justice:
(i)Tribunal shall scrupulously follow Rules 255(3) and 260(3) of the
Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989;
(ii) Ordinarily the notice period provided in Rule 260(3) of the said Rules
shall not exceed 15 days from the date of issue of such notice
contemplated therein;
(iii) Only in exceptional cases can the Tribunal extend the said period of
15 days, but while extending it beyond the period of 15 days the Tribunal
will have to record reasons in writing as to why the period is so extended;
(iv) In no case, however, the notice period shall extend beyond the period
of four weeks from the date of issue of such notice.
24 The said directions continue to bind the Tribunals in the State. We may
note here that Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 260 provides that service of notice shall be
by way of personal service through Bailiff or R.P.A.D or by both. If the
address of the owner or driver of the offending vehicle or the insurer of the
vehicle is of a place which beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, ordinarily, the notice shall be issued simultaneously

through Bailiff and by R.P.A.D or speed post to facilitate early service. The
State will have to consider of amending the Maharashtra Rules for
incorporating the provision regarding service of notice through courier
services.
RELUCTANCE OF THE DOCTORS TO ISSUE DISABILITY
CERTIFICATES

25 Another issue raised is as regards the reluctance of the reputed Doctors
or even the hospitals to issue disability certificates though they willingly
provide treatment to the victims. One of the reasons is that the disability
certificates are not accepted by the insurers and therefore, the concerned
Doctors are compelled to attend the Tribunal for giving evidence. In all the
Districts in the State (except Mumbai), the District Judges who are holding
posts of Chairman or Members of the Tribunal are also entrusted with the
other civil and criminal work. On occasions, there are adjournments sought by
the lawyers. Very often the Members of the medical profession are required to
wait for several hours for recording their evidence. On many occasions, they
are required to go back without their evidence being recorded. Perhaps, the
witnesses are treated on par with the litigants and are made to wait in a queue.
Rule 267 provides that the evidence of medical witnesses shall be taken down
as nearly as may be, word to word. There is no prohibition on recording the
evidence of the medical practitioners or for that matter other witnesses
including claimants/applicants through video conferencing or if video
conferencing is not available, through applications providing for video chat
services such as skype. The Tribunals are well advised to take recourse to
such methods for recording the evidence of the Doctors or other experts. If
the evidence of the medical practitioners is recorded in such a manner, their
time will not be wasted and there may not be any reluctance on their part to
issue disability certificates. The Registry may consider of issuing a Circular on
the administrative side in this behalf.
DIRECTIONS OF THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF JAI PRAKASH

26 Our attention is invited to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Jai Prakash. In paragraphs 9 and 10, the Apex Court observed thus:
9. The legislature tried to reduce the period of pendency of claim cases and
quicken the process of determination of compensation by making two significant changes in
the Act, by Amendment Act 54 of 1994, making it mandatory for registration of a motor
accident claim within one month of receipt of first information of the accident, without the
claimants having to file a claim petition. Sub-Section (6) of Section 158 of the Act provides:
“158. (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily
injury to any person is recorded or report under this Section is completed by a police officer,
the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days
from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such
report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the insurer
concerned, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days
of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer.”
Sub-Section (4) of Section 166 of the Act reads thus:
“166. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under subSection
(6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.”

“12. But unfortunately neither the police nor the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals have
made any effort to implement these mandatory provisions of the Act. If these provisions are
faithfully and effectively implemented, it will be possible for the victims of accident and/or
their families to get compensation, in a span of few months. There is, therefore, an urgent
need for the police authorities concerned and the Tribunals to follow the mandate of these
provisions.”
In paragraph 16 and 20 following directions were issued:-
“16. The Director General of Police of each State is directed to instruct all police stations in
his State to comply with the provisions of Section 158(6) of the Act. For this purpose, the
following steps will have to be taken by the Station House Officers of the jurisdictional
police stations:
(i) Accident information report (“AIR”, for short) in Form No. 54 of the Central Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989 shall be submitted by the police (Station House Officer) to the
jurisdictional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, within 30 days of the registration of the
FIR. In addition to the particulars required to be furnished in Form No. 54, the police
should also collect and furnish the following additional particulars in the AIR to the
Tribunal:
(i) The age of the victims at the time of accident;
(ii) The income of the victim;
(iii) The names and ages of the dependent family members.
(ii) The AIR shall be accompanied by the attested copies of the FIR, site
sketch/mahazar/photographs of the place of occurrence, driving licence of the driver,
insurance policy (and if necessary, fitness certificate) of the vehicle and post-mortem report
(in case of death) or the injury/wound certificate (in case of injuries). The names/addresses
of injured or dependent family members of the deceased should also be furnished to the
Tribunal.
(iii) Simultaneously, a copy of the AIR with annexures thereto shall be furnished to the
insurance company concerned to enable the insurer to process the claim.
(iv) The police shall notify the first date of hearing fixed by the Tribunal to the victim
(injured) or the family of the victim (in case of death) and the driver, owner and insurer. If
so directed by the Tribunal, the police may secure their presence on the first date of
hearing.”

“Directions to the Claims Tribunals
“20. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to instruct all Claims Tribunals
in his State to register the reports of accidents received under Section 158(6) of the Act as
applications for compensation under Section 166(4) of the Act and deal with them without
waiting for the filing of claim applications by the injured or by the family of the deceased.
The Registrar General shall ensure that necessary registers, forms and other support is
extended to the Tribunal to give effect to Section 166(4) of the Act.”
27 If the Registrar General of this Court has not issued instructions in
terms of the said directions, he shall do so immediately in addition to the
directions which are required to be issued in terms of this decision.
28 A grievance was made across the bar that even the hospitals run by the
State Government and public authorities like Municipal Corporations are
reluctant to issue disability certificate setting out specified percentage of
disability though victims are treated in the said hospital. The State
Government will have to be look into this aspect and issue appropriate
directions.
29 It is urged that the Tribunals are not disposing of the claim petitions
under Sections 163-A and 140 of the M.V.Act within the outer limit provided
under the Rules 255 and 255A. It must me noted that the Courts in the state
are not operating in ideal conditions. They lack proper infrastructure. There is
always a problem of overflowing dockets. Every Member of the Tribunal is
fully aware of the urgency involved in such cases. They are always sensitive
about the plight of the claimants. Hence, we are not issuing any directions on
this aspect.
30 In view of discussion made above, we pass the following order:-
(i)The state government shall issue a direction to all the concerned
officers of the Motor Vehicles Department to scrupulously
implement sub-Rule (2) of Rule 251 of the Maharashtra Rules by
submitting reports in form R.A.R. The State Government shall

take appropriate decision on the issue of uploading the said forms
on a website;
(ii)The Director General of Police shall issue instructions to all the
Police Stations in the State to scrupulously follow and implement
the provisions of sub-Rules (6) and (8) of Rule 254 of the
Maharashtra Rule read with Section 160 of the M.V.Act. The State
Government shall issue a direction for uploading form Comp.AA
on either a dedicated website or on its existing website by making a
provision for Police Station wise and date wise search. The State
Government shall consider of amending the sub-Rule (8) of Rule
254 for making a provision for submitting information as regards
all the accidents involving bodily injury;
(iii)We hold that the Tribunals are not entitled to insist on personal
presence of the applicants at the time of filing of the claim
petitions;
(iv)Subject to what is observed above, the Tribunals shall not refuse
to accept the filing of the claim petitions on the ground that the
documents as provided in Rules 254 to 255-A of the Maharashtra
Rules are not filed along with the claim petitions. However,
compliance with Rule 256 is mandatory. But attestation by the
Advocate for the applicants on photographs will be mandatory
provided the claim petition is either filed or sent by post by an
Advocate;
(iv)We hold that in a given case, on an application made by the
applicant or applicants, or suo motu, the Tribunal can issue a
direction to the Officer In-charge of any Police Station to furnish
information directly to the Tribunal in accordance with Sub-Rule 6
of Rule 254. The Tribunal, in a give case can always issue a
direction to furnish a copy of form Comp.AA. The Tribunal can
also issue a direction to the concerned Officer to produce form
R.A.R. In view of clause (b) of Rule 276 of the Maharashtra Rules,
the Tribunal can exercise the power under Order XVI of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 by issuing a summons to produce the
aforesaid documents. The said power can be exercised at any stage
of the claim petitions. In fact, such a direction can be given by the
Tribunal on its own to ensure that the claim petitions under Section
140 or 163-A are disposed of within the time specified under SubRule
3 of both the Rules 255 and 255-A.
(v)We strongly recommend to the State Government to repeal Rule
263 of Maharashtra Rules which requires payment of process fees
on claim petitions. If Rule 263 is not repealed, it may expose itself
to the vice of being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, the State Government shall take
necessary action in accordance with law;
(vi)The directions issued in the decision of this Court in the case of
Anish Kondra continue to bind all the Tribunals. In addition, If the
address of the owner or driver of the offending vehicle or the
insurer of the vehicle is of a place which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, ordinarily, the notice shall be issued
simultaneously through Bailiff and by R.P.A.D or Speed Post to
facilitate early service.
(vii) It will be appropriate if the State Government amends the
Maharashtra Rules to facilitate service of notice through Courier
service as provided in sub-Rule(3) of Rule 9 of Order V of the
Code of Civil Procedure,1908;
(viii)There is no prohibition on recording the evidence of the
medical practitioner or for that matter other witnesses including
claimants through video conferencing or if video conferencing is
not available, through applications providing for video chat
services. The Tribunals are well advised to take recourse to such
method for recording the evidence of the Medical Practitioners or
other experts. If the evidence of the Medical Practitioners is
recorded in such a manner, their time will not be wasted. The
Registry may consider of issuing a Circular on the administrative

side in this behalf.
(ix)If the Regist

Whether it is necessary to make enquiry U/S 202 of crpc in case of dishonour of cheque?

🔷 *Whether it is necessary to make enquiry U/S 202 of crpc in case of dishonour of cheque?*

The dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Indian Bank Association
(supra) and the Full Bench of this court in Rajesh Chalke (supra) makes it
clear that in the complaints under section 138 NI Act, the Magistrate is not
obliged to examine the complainant under section 200 Cr.PC and can rely
on affidavit filed along with the complaint. The Magistrate can take
cognizance and issue summons if upon scrutinizing the complaint, the
affidavit and the documents he is satisfied that prima facie offence has been
made out against the accused.
40. It is also pertinent to note that the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Act, 2015 defines and restricts the territorial jurisdiction to a
court specified in Section 142 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act. The said issue of
territorial jurisdiction which has to be decided on the basis of the
documents, eliminates the need for further inquiry on jurisdictional issue.
It therefore follows that the Magistrate can arrive at the requisite
satisfaction about the essential ingredients of the offence including the
issue of territorial jurisdiction at the end of the enquiry under Section 200

Cr.P.C itself and this obviates the need of holding further enquiry under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. This being the position further enquiry under sub
section (1) of Section 202 of the Code, if held to be mandatory in
complaints filed under Section 138 N.I.Act, will be nothing but ritualistic,
idle and an empty formality.
41. It may be mentioned that the decision of the full bench of this court in
Rajesh Chalke (supra_ was not brought to the notice of the learned Single
Judge in Netcore (Cri. Writ Petition No. 138 of 2011). Similarly, the
decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Indian Bank Associates (supra) as well
as the decision of the full bench of this court in Rajesh Chalke were not
brought to the notice of the learned single judge in Vimal Powerloom
(supra). Consequently, the learned Single Judges of this Court had no
occasion to consider the principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as
the full bench of this Court in the aforesaid  decisions. These two decisions
therefore cannot be considered as binding precedents. In any case, upon
consideration of the decision in Indian Banks Association (supra) and
Rajesh Chalke (supra) it would be appropriate to follow the decision in
Bansilal Kabra (supra), and Vinod vs. SBI Global (supra).
*IN THE HIGH* *COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY*
*CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION*
*CRIMINAL* APPLICATION NO. 716 OF 2015
with
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 717 OF 2015

*Dr. (Mrs) Rajul Ketan Raj v/s. Reliance Capital Ltd. & Anr.*

CORAM : SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 12th FEBRUARY, 2016.

*Citation;2016 ALLMR(CRI)1224*

Whether minor driving motor cycle without licence is entitled to get compensation in case of accident

*Whether minor driving motor cycle without licence is entitled to get compensation in case of accident?*

 Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to
be noted that in a vehicular accident between the Motorcycle
No.GJ 2 AA 5546, which at the relevant time was being driven
by the original injured claimant-minor and one Jeep No.GJ 2 R
3829, driver of the Motorcycle-original injured claimant
sustained permanent partial disability to the extent of 7%. It
is also required to be noted that as such on appreciation of
evidence, the learned tribunal has held the driver of the Jeep
involved in the accident sole negligent in the accident. Under
the circumstances and normally once the driver of the
offending vehicle is held to be sole negligent for the accident
the original claimant is entitled to the compensation from the
driver-owner and the Insurer of the vehicle whose driver is held
to be sole negligent. As per settled proposition of law only that
much amount is required to be deducted and / or original
claimant is not entitled to the extent he is held contributory
negligent for the accident. However, in the present case, the
learned tribunal has deducted 70% i.e. 10% towards
negligence of the minor injured claimant and 60% towards
negligence of the father-owner of the Motorcycle permitting his
minor son to drive the Motorcycle though he was not holding
valid license to drive the Motorcycle. On the aforesaid ground
no amount of compensation could have been deducted and / or
denied to the original claimant, more particularly, when so far
as the accident is concerned the original injured claimant is
not held negligent / contributory negligent at all. 
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD*
FIRST APPEAL NO. 2029 of 2008

*MINOR SHAKTISINH ZALA.*
V
*ZALA RANVIRSINH RANUBHA & 4.*
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
Date : 25/02/2016
*Citation:2016(6) ALLMR(JOURNAL)7*

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Acknowledgement - Payment by cheque amounts to acknowledgment irrespective of the fact that cheque was dishonoured when presented.

IMPORTANT DECISIONS(21.09.2017)

Acknowledgement - Payment by cheque amounts to acknowledgment irrespective of the fact that cheque was dishonoured when presented. (2017(3) Civil Court Cases 703 (Delhi) 

Contempt of Courts - Default alleged though is unmistakably evident, but in the absence of any wilful or deliberate intention to commit the same, a person is not liable for contempt. (2017(3) Apex Court Judgments 080 (S.C.) 

Doctor - Performed operation in good faith - Nothing on record that accused concealed the fact regarding treatment - Element of cheating is not made out merely because accused had given assurance to control the condition of patient - Charge sheet quashed.(2017(3) Criminal Court Cases 592 (Allahabad) 

Exhibiting of documents - Documents not exhibited due to lack of proper care - Documents already on record allowed to be exhibited in accordance with law before proceeding with trial of the case. (2017(3) Civil Court Cases 614 (Sikkim) 

Rash and negligent driving - Failure to prove that it was accused who was driving the vehicle - Merely because accused was engaged as a driver of offending vehicle, ipso facto cannot be substitute for express proof of fact that vehicle infact was driven by accused at the time of accident - Accused acquitted. (2017(3) Criminal Court Cases 656 (H.P.) 

Tuesday, September 19, 2017

Procedure for Complaint Filed U/Sec 138 N.I.Act

Procedure for Complaint Filed U/Sec 138 N.I.Act

by  SANJAY KUMAR SINHA

For the  Knowledge  of  common persons who are involved in false cases of Section 138 NiI. Act must know the following Procedure of Law :-

 

A).UNDER PROVISIONS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.SEC.138  A LEGAL NOTICE ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINENT IS ISSUED TO THE DEFAULTER WHOSE CHEQUE IS DISHONOURED.IT SHOULD BE ISSUED WITHIN 15 DAYS OF DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE BY REGISTERED POST A.D.ALL FACTS INCLUDING THE NATURE OF TRANSACTION, AMOUNT OF LOAN AND OR ANY OTHER LEGALY ENFORCEABLE DEBT AGAINSTWHICH THE SAID CHEQUE WAS ISSUED AND THE DATE OF DEPOSIT IN BANK AND DATE OFDISHONOUR OF CHEQUE SHOULD BE MENTIONED THE NOTICE.

 

B) THE PERSON WHO HAS ISSUED CHEQUE IS DIRECTED TO MAKE THE PAYMENT OF AMOUNT OF DISHONOURED CHEQUE WITHIN 15 DAYS. IN C ASE THE SAID PAYMENT IS MADE WITHIN 15 DAYS OF SERVICE OF NOTICE THEN THE MATTER ENDS.

 

C.BUT IN CASE THE SAID PAYMENT IS NOT MADE WITHIN 15 DAYS THEN THE COMPLAINENT HAS TO FILE A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE COURT WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE EXPIRY OF  NOTICE PERIOD OF 15 DAYS .

 

D) THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENTS OF COMPLAINENT/ ADVOCATE FOR COMPLAINENT AND ISSUE PROCESS UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I.ACT.

 

E.)THE SUMMONS ARE SENT AND SERVED THROUGH POLICE STATION WHERE ACCUSED IS RESIDING.

 

F)KINDLY NOTE THAT IN N.I.ACT.SEC.138 CASES , POLICE IS LIMITED TO ONLY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND IN CASE ACCUSED REMAINS ABSENT ON COURT DATE AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS THEN ONLY WARRANT IS SENT TO POLICE STATION TO PRODUCE ACCUSED IN COURT.

 

G)BUT IT IS OBSERVED IN SEVERAL CASES THAT ACCUSED PERSONS ARE HARASSED BY CONCERNED PERSONS WHO ARE DIRECTED TO SERVE NOTICE/WARRANT.

 

H)HENCE IT IS ADVISIBLE THAT ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID OF THIS COURT CASE AND REGULARLY ATTEND COURT DATES SO THAT WARRANT WILL NOT BE ISSUED AND FURTHER UNNECESSARY HARASSMENT WILL BE PREVENTED.

 

I) KINDLY NOTE THAT OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I.ACT IS A BAILABLE OFFENCE AS THE PUNISHMENT PROVIDED FOR  SAID OFFENCE IS TWO YEARS.

 

J) ACCUSED HAS TO SUBMIT SURETY WITH ALL SURETY DOCUMENTS INCLUDING OWENERSHIP DOCUMENTS OF HOUSE OR LAND OWNED BY SURETY, HIS ADDRESS PROOF INCLUDING RATION CARD, ELECTION IDENTITY CARD, PHOTO AND ADDRESS PROOF OF SURETY AND ACCUSED.ON RECEIVING SUMMONS FROM THE COURT THE ACCUSED AND SURETY SHOULD REMAIN PRESENT IN COURT WITH ALL ABOVEMENTIONED DOCUMENTS AND COURT WILL ACCEPT THE SURETY AND ON SIGNING BONDS BY ACCUSED AND SURETY, THE BAIL WILL BE GRANTED AND ACCUSED WILL BE RELEASED BY COURT.

 

K) THEN THE COMPLAINENT WILL FILE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR HIS EVIDENCE WITH ALL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS COMPLAINT.THIS IS CALLED EXAM IN CHIEF OF COMPLAINENT.THEN ACCUSED/HIS ADVOCATE WILL CROSS EXAMINE THE COMPLAINENT.

 

L) COMPLAINENT CAN SUBMIT ADDITIONAL WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT.

 

M) THEN ONCE WITNESSES OF COMPLAINENT ARE OVER THEN STATEMENT OF ACCUSED IS RECORDED UNDER SEC.313 OF CRPC .ACCUSED WILL BE ASKED TO GIVE REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM.

 

N)THEN WITNESSES OF ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE WILL BE PRODUCED AND THE EVIDENCE WILL BE RECORDED BY THE COURT.

 

O)LAST STAGE IS OF ARGUMENTS OF ADVOCATE OF COMPLAINENT AND ARGUMENT OF ADVOCATE OF ACCUSED

 

P) COURT WILL PASS THE JUDGEMENT.

IN CASE ACCUSED IS ACQUITED THEN MATTER ENDS.

BUT IN CASE ACCUSED IS CONVICTED   THEN IMMEDIATELY ACCUSED SHOULD SUBMIT BAIL APPLICATION AND GIVE  SURETY AND PRAY FOR TIME TO APPEAL TO SESSIONS COURT. COURT WILL DIRECT HIM TO DEPOSIT FINE AS PER JUDGEMENT  IN THE COURT IMMEDIATELYTHEN HE WILL BE RELEASED.

HE SHOULD APPEAL TO SESSIONS COURT WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM THE DATE OF JUDGEMENT OF LOWER COURT.

 

Q) CRIMINAL APPEAL WITH APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE AND FOR BAIL WILL BE GIVEN HEARING BY THE DIST AND SESSIONS COURT AND ON FURNISHING SURETY AS PER DIRECTIONS OF COURT INCLUDING DEPOSIT OF SOME AMOUNT TOWARDS COMPENSATION ORDERED AS PER JUDGEMENT THE ACCUSED WILL BE RELEASED ON BAIL.

 

R).KINDLY NOTE THAT THE DISPUTE MAY GO ON FROM DISTRICT AND SESSIONS COURT TO HIGH COURT AND THEN TO SUPREME COURT.

 

S).KINDLY NOTE THAT THERE IS AMMENDMENT IN THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT. THE OFFENCE IS MADE COMPOUNDABLE .HENCE IN CASE THE MATTER IS SETTLED BETWEEN THE PARTIES , THEN ON AN APPLICATION IN THE COURT , THE COURT MAY ALLOW TO COMPOUND THE CASE AND CLOSE THE CASE.

 

T) KINDLY NOTE THAT THESE ARE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND REFERENCE OF ALL CONCERNED WHO ARE HARASSED BY THE COMPLAINENTS BY FORCING THE BORROWERS TO ISSUE BLANK SIGNED CHEQUES IN ADVANCE AT THE TIME OF SANCTION OF LOAN.

 

U) SUCH BLANK CHEQUES ARE MISUSED BY THE COMPLAINENTS BY WRITING FALSE AND FICTITIOUS AMOUNTS AND GETING THOSE CHEQUES DISHONOURED.

 

V) I HAVE WON SEVERAL CASES ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED AND HAVE GOT ACQUITTED THE ACCUSED PERSONS FROM CHARGES OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.SEC.138.I HAVE SEEN THE HARASSMENT OF ENTIRE FAMILY OF THE ACCUSED PERSONS WHO ARE CONTINEOUSLY UNDER TENSION DUE TO FALSE CASES FILED BY COMPLAINENTS.

Sunday, September 17, 2017

Procedure for Complaint Filed U/Sec 138 N.I.Act

Procedure for Complaint Filed U/Sec 138 N.I.Act

by  SANJAY KUMAR SINHA

For the  Knowledge  of  common persons who are involved in false cases of Section 138 NiI. Act must know the following Procedure of Law :-

 

A).UNDER PROVISIONS OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.SEC.138  A LEGAL NOTICE ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINENT IS ISSUED TO THE DEFAULTER WHOSE CHEQUE IS DISHONOURED.IT SHOULD BE ISSUED WITHIN 15 DAYS OF DISHONOUR OF CHEQUE BY REGISTERED POST A.D.ALL FACTS INCLUDING THE NATURE OF TRANSACTION, AMOUNT OF LOAN AND OR ANY OTHER LEGALY ENFORCEABLE DEBT AGAINSTWHICH THE SAID CHEQUE WAS ISSUED AND THE DATE OF DEPOSIT IN BANK AND DATE OFDISHONOUR OF CHEQUE SHOULD BE MENTIONED THE NOTICE.

 

B) THE PERSON WHO HAS ISSUED CHEQUE IS DIRECTED TO MAKE THE PAYMENT OF AMOUNT OF DISHONOURED CHEQUE WITHIN 15 DAYS. IN C ASE THE SAID PAYMENT IS MADE WITHIN 15 DAYS OF SERVICE OF NOTICE THEN THE MATTER ENDS.

 

C.BUT IN CASE THE SAID PAYMENT IS NOT MADE WITHIN 15 DAYS THEN THE COMPLAINENT HAS TO FILE A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE COURT WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE EXPIRY OF  NOTICE PERIOD OF 15 DAYS .

 

D) THE COURT WILL HEAR ARGUMENTS OF COMPLAINENT/ ADVOCATE FOR COMPLAINENT AND ISSUE PROCESS UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I.ACT.

 

E.)THE SUMMONS ARE SENT AND SERVED THROUGH POLICE STATION WHERE ACCUSED IS RESIDING.

 

F)KINDLY NOTE THAT IN N.I.ACT.SEC.138 CASES , POLICE IS LIMITED TO ONLY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND IN CASE ACCUSED REMAINS ABSENT ON COURT DATE AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS THEN ONLY WARRANT IS SENT TO POLICE STATION TO PRODUCE ACCUSED IN COURT.

 

G)BUT IT IS OBSERVED IN SEVERAL CASES THAT ACCUSED PERSONS ARE HARASSED BY CONCERNED PERSONS WHO ARE DIRECTED TO SERVE NOTICE/WARRANT.

 

H)HENCE IT IS ADVISIBLE THAT ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID OF THIS COURT CASE AND REGULARLY ATTEND COURT DATES SO THAT WARRANT WILL NOT BE ISSUED AND FURTHER UNNECESSARY HARASSMENT WILL BE PREVENTED.

 

I) KINDLY NOTE THAT OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I.ACT IS A BAILABLE OFFENCE AS THE PUNISHMENT PROVIDED FOR  SAID OFFENCE IS TWO YEARS.

 

J) ACCUSED HAS TO SUBMIT SURETY WITH ALL SURETY DOCUMENTS INCLUDING OWENERSHIP DOCUMENTS OF HOUSE OR LAND OWNED BY SURETY, HIS ADDRESS PROOF INCLUDING RATION CARD, ELECTION IDENTITY CARD, PHOTO AND ADDRESS PROOF OF SURETY AND ACCUSED.ON RECEIVING SUMMONS FROM THE COURT THE ACCUSED AND SURETY SHOULD REMAIN PRESENT IN COURT WITH ALL ABOVEMENTIONED DOCUMENTS AND COURT WILL ACCEPT THE SURETY AND ON SIGNING BONDS BY ACCUSED AND SURETY, THE BAIL WILL BE GRANTED AND ACCUSED WILL BE RELEASED BY COURT.

 

K) THEN THE COMPLAINENT WILL FILE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR HIS EVIDENCE WITH ALL ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS COMPLAINT.THIS IS CALLED EXAM IN CHIEF OF COMPLAINENT.THEN ACCUSED/HIS ADVOCATE WILL CROSS EXAMINE THE COMPLAINENT.

 

L) COMPLAINENT CAN SUBMIT ADDITIONAL WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT.

 

M) THEN ONCE WITNESSES OF COMPLAINENT ARE OVER THEN STATEMENT OF ACCUSED IS RECORDED UNDER SEC.313 OF CRPC .ACCUSED WILL BE ASKED TO GIVE REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM.

 

N)THEN WITNESSES OF ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE WILL BE PRODUCED AND THE EVIDENCE WILL BE RECORDED BY THE COURT.

 

O)LAST STAGE IS OF ARGUMENTS OF ADVOCATE OF COMPLAINENT AND ARGUMENT OF ADVOCATE OF ACCUSED

 

P) COURT WILL PASS THE JUDGEMENT.

IN CASE ACCUSED IS ACQUITED THEN MATTER ENDS.

BUT IN CASE ACCUSED IS CONVICTED   THEN IMMEDIATELY ACCUSED SHOULD SUBMIT BAIL APPLICATION AND GIVE  SURETY AND PRAY FOR TIME TO APPEAL TO SESSIONS COURT. COURT WILL DIRECT HIM TO DEPOSIT FINE AS PER JUDGEMENT  IN THE COURT IMMEDIATELYTHEN HE WILL BE RELEASED.

HE SHOULD APPEAL TO SESSIONS COURT WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM THE DATE OF JUDGEMENT OF LOWER COURT.

 

Q) CRIMINAL APPEAL WITH APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE AND FOR BAIL WILL BE GIVEN HEARING BY THE DIST AND SESSIONS COURT AND ON FURNISHING SURETY AS PER DIRECTIONS OF COURT INCLUDING DEPOSIT OF SOME AMOUNT TOWARDS COMPENSATION ORDERED AS PER JUDGEMENT THE ACCUSED WILL BE RELEASED ON BAIL.

 

R).KINDLY NOTE THAT THE DISPUTE MAY GO ON FROM DISTRICT AND SESSIONS COURT TO HIGH COURT AND THEN TO SUPREME COURT.

 

S).KINDLY NOTE THAT THERE IS AMMENDMENT IN THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT. THE OFFENCE IS MADE COMPOUNDABLE .HENCE IN CASE THE MATTER IS SETTLED BETWEEN THE PARTIES , THEN ON AN APPLICATION IN THE COURT , THE COURT MAY ALLOW TO COMPOUND THE CASE AND CLOSE THE CASE.

 

T) KINDLY NOTE THAT THESE ARE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND REFERENCE OF ALL CONCERNED WHO ARE HARASSED BY THE COMPLAINENTS BY FORCING THE BORROWERS TO ISSUE BLANK SIGNED CHEQUES IN ADVANCE AT THE TIME OF SANCTION OF LOAN.

 

U) SUCH BLANK CHEQUES ARE MISUSED BY THE COMPLAINENTS BY WRITING FALSE AND FICTITIOUS AMOUNTS AND GETING THOSE CHEQUES DISHONOURED.

 

V) I HAVE WON SEVERAL CASES ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED AND HAVE GOT ACQUITTED THE ACCUSED PERSONS FROM CHARGES OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.SEC.138.I HAVE SEEN THE HARASSMENT OF ENTIRE FAMILY OF THE ACCUSED PERSONS WHO ARE CONTINEOUSLY UNDER TENSION DUE TO FALSE CASES FILED BY COMPLAINENTS.

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Accused evidence can be submitted by an affidavit instead of oral evidence. Section 315 Cr.P.C referred to.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.  Accused evidence can be submitted by an affidavit instead of oral evidence. Section 315 Cr.P.C referred to.

Afzal Pasha vs Mohammed Ameerjan
Criminal Petition 1684/2016
Decided on 9 August 2016
Justice Anand Byrareddy

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/127366/1/CRLP1684-16-09-08-2016.pdf

Offence Under SEC.138 NI Act Is Person Specific. Concept Of ‘Taking Cognizance Of The Offence And Not The Offender’ Not Appropriate In Cheque Cases: SC

Offence Under SEC.138 NI Act Is Person Specific. Concept Of ‘Taking Cognizance Of The Offence And Not The Offender’ Not Appropriate In Cheque Cases: SC [Read Judgment]

Read more at: http://www.livelaw.in/offence-sec-138-ni-act-person-specific-concept-taking-cognizance-offence-not-offender-not-appropriate-cheque-cases-sc-read-judgment/

How to appreciate evidence in case of dishonour of cheque U/S 138 of NI Act?

How to appreciate evidence in case of dishonour of cheque U/S 138 of NI Act?

Admittedly, the accused had replied to the legal notice sent by the complainant to her and in the said reply, the accused had specifically denied that she had received the amount of ` 4,39,424/- at any time in lump sum or in installments. It was stated in the reply that the complainant had approached the accused for financial assistance and the accused had told him that she does not have money now, but is likely to get the same by 25/08/2010 and, therefore, had issued the cheque to him bearing No. 299420 dated 31/08/2010 drawn on Corporation Bank, Panaji Branch for an amount of ` 2,67,424/-. In the reply, the accused further stated that she was not able to arrange for the money and she requested the complainant not to deposit the said cheque and to handover the said cheque back to her, but the complainant fraudulently deposited the said cheque. It was, therefore, made clear by the accused that the complainant had to establish that there was legally enforceable debt or other  liability. The case of the complainant was that the accused  required the money for construction of residential house i.e. for purchase of construction material. However, there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that the accused was constructing any residential house or that she had paid any bills towards the purchase of construction materials. The complainant has not produced a single receipt or acknowledgment issued by the accused for having received any amount from the complainant. In his deposition, the complainant (AW1) stated that he paid the said amount by arranging from his Savings Bank Account and by borrowing some amount from friends. He even stated the name of one of the friends as Albert Norton. The complainant, however, did not produce passbook of his Savings Bank Account or any statement of account issued by the bank to prove that he had withdrawn any money from the Savings Bank Account. The complainant also did not examine said Mr. Albert Norton to prove that he had borrowed money from him to be given to the accused. In fact, AW1 stated that he is having the statement of Bank to show the withdrawal from 05/09/2009 to 10/06/2010, but he did not produce any such statement due to which the trial Court has rightly drawn adverse inference.
It is pertinent to note that neither in the complaint nor in the affidavit-in-evidence the complainant stated that the  accused had paid the amount of ` 1,72,000/- and, therefore, the balance amount was ` 2,67,424/-. It is true that in the cross-examination, a suggestion was put to AW1 that the accused had paid to him a sum of ` 1,25,000/- on 02/06/2010 in front of Federal Bank, Panaji in the presence of one Ganesh Rao. However, a perusal of the cross-examination reveals that this sum of ` 1,25,000/- has nothing to do with the alleged amount of ` 4,39,424/-. A specific suggestion has been put to AW1 that his statement that the said amount of ` 1,25,000/- was paid to AW1 by the accused out of ` 4,39,424/- is a false statement. In his cross-examination, AW1 has stated that the accused had paid some amount to him and balance amount was ` 2,67,424/-. If really, the accused had paid `1,25,000/- towards the part payment of the amount of ` 4,39,424/-, then, the balance would not be ` 2,67,424/-, but would be `3,14,424/-.
In the circumstances above, the findings of the trial Court to the effect that the complainant failed to prove that he had advanced ` 4,39,424/- to the accused and that there was no legally enforceable debt is not erroneous. The finding of the trial Court that the accused rebutted the presumption available under the N. I. Act is also not erroneous.
Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)1039, 2015(3)BomCR(Cri)656, 2015(6)MhLj91

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2012
Decided On: 10.11.2014
Gajanan Lobaji Kitturkar
Vs.
Sumati S. Bhandari
Coram:
U.V. Bakre, J.

1.Heard Mr. Mulgoankar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Teles, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1 and Mrs. Pinto, learned CRIA19-12 2 Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 31/10/2011 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji, Goa (trial Court, for short) in Criminal Case No. OA NIA 424/2010/C.
3. The appellant was the complainant and the respondent no. 1 was the accused in the said case. Parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as per their status in the said Criminal Case.
4. The complainant had filed the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (N.I. Act, for short) which gave rise to the said Criminal Case No. OA NIA 424/2010/C.
5. Case of the complainant, in short, was as follows :
The complainant and the accused were working for New India Assurance Company Limited. The accused needed financial assistance as she was in the process of constructing her residential house and hence, requested the complainant, CRIA19-12 3 somewhere in the month of September, 2009, to advance money to her and assured that she will repay the same within a period of six months. The complainant believed the accused and, from time to time, arranged for money and paid the same to the accused to pay her bills and for required construction material. The total amount of ` 4,39,424/- was received by the accused from the complainant in various instalments roughly between 05/09/2009 and 10/06/2010. Towards the full and final settlement/payment of the total amount payable by the accused to the complainant, the accused issued to the complainant a cheque bearing no. 299420 dated 31/08/2010 drawn on the Corporation Bank, Panaji Branch for a sum of ` 2,67,424/-. The said cheque, when presented to the banker of the complainant, was returned dishonoured with endorsement "funds insufficient". The complainant addressed a demand notice to the accused through his Advocate as per law. The notice was received by the accused, who replied to the same through her Advocate thereby denying the liability and alleging that the complainant had himself approached her for financial assistance and in order to help him, she had issued the said cheque.
6. The accused pleaded not guilty to the substance of accusation explained to her. The complainant examined himself CRIA19-12 4 as AW1 and produced the cheque, the pay in slip, cheque return memo, postal slip, A.D. Card, the legal notice and the reply of the accused. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The accused denied the case of the complainant and stated that the complainant had approached the accused for financial assistance and, therefore, the accused had issued the cheque bearing No. 299420 for ` 2,67,424/- to the complainant, but ultimately the accused could not make arrangement for the money and, therefore, she had requested the complainant not to deposit the said cheque and to give it back to her, but the accused misused the same. The accused did not examine any witness.
7. Upon consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Court found that the complainant failed to prove that there was any legally enforceable liability. The trial Court further held that the complainant failed to prove that he had advanced the said sum of ` 4,39,424/-. It held that the accused had rebutted the presumption available under the Act. The accused, therefore, came to be acquitted. The complainant is aggrieved by the acquittal and has filed the present appeal.
8. Mr. Mulgaonkar, learned Counsel for the complainant  submitted that no lump sum payment was made by the complainant to the accused and that the amounts were paid in various instalments and in such circumstances, Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act was not applicable and, therefore, the learned trial Court erred in applying the said Section and disbelieving the case of the complainant on that count. He further submitted that the trial Court did not at all consider the impact of the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act to ascertain whether the same was rebutted by the accused. He pointed out from the cross-examination of AW1 that there was a suggestion put to the complainant that he had received a sum of ` 1,25,000/- from the accused. According to the learned Counsel, this itself showed that there was a debt. Learned Counsel further submitted that the accused did not examine herself and that there was no cogent explanation regarding the cheque for ` 2,67,424/- given by the accused to the complainant. He, therefore, urged that the impugned judgment and order is perverse and, therefore, bound to be quashed and set aside and the accused ought to be convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Teles, learned Counsel for the accused read out certain paragraphs from the impugned  judgment and submitted that no glaring error has been shown by the complainant in the judgment of the trial Court and, therefore, this Court cannot interfere with the said judgment of acquittal which is based on correct appreciation of the evidence on record.
10. I have gone through the record and proceedings of the said Criminal Case No. OA NIA 424/2010/C and considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties.
11. There is no dispute that the accused had issued cheque dated 31/08/2010 for ` 2,67,424/- in favour of the complainant which was presented by the complainant to his banker within the validity period but the same was returned back for reason "funds insufficient". There is no dispute that the complainant, within the prescribed time, issued legal notice to the accused as required under section 138 of the N.I. Act but the accused failed to comply with the requirement thereof due to which the complainant filed complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, within the prescribed time limit.
12. The only question which arises for determination is whether the trial court was justified in holding that the accused had discharged the burden of proving that the cheque was not issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt.
13. Though it is true that the learned trial Court has not specifically mentioned the provision of Section 139 of the N. I. Act which provides for the presumption in respect of a cheque, however, it is seen that the trial Court has specifically held that the accused has rebutted the presumption available under the Act which obviously is the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act. Said Section 139 of the N. I. Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Thus, merely because a cheque has been issued, the same is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the same was issued for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act is rebuttable. The learned Trial Court has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Janardan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, [MANU/SC/0503/2008 : (2008) 4 SCC 54], wherein it has been held that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts whereas the standard of proof so as to prove the defence on the part of the  accused is preponderance of probability which can be drawn not only from the material brought on record by the parties, but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. The accused can rebut the presumption by relying upon the material which has come on record in the cross-examination of the witness and he/she need not examine himself/herself.
14. Admittedly, the accused had replied to the legal notice sent by the complainant to her and in the said reply, the accused had specifically denied that she had received the amount of ` 4,39,424/- at any time in lump sum or in installments. It was stated in the reply that the complainant had approached the accused for financial assistance and the accused had told him that she does not have money now, but is likely to get the same by 25/08/2010 and, therefore, had issued the cheque to him bearing No. 299420 dated 31/08/2010 drawn on Corporation Bank, Panaji Branch for an amount of ` 2,67,424/-. In the reply, the accused further stated that she was not able to arrange for the money and she requested the complainant not to deposit the said cheque and to handover the said cheque back to her, but the complainant fraudulently deposited the said cheque. It was, therefore, made clear by the accused that the complainant had to establish that there was legally enforceable debt or other CRIA19-12 9 liability.
15. In the complaint, the complainant has specifically stated that an amount of ` 4,39,424/- was given by him to the accused and that the cheque for a sum of ` 2,67,424/- was given towards full and final settlement/payment of the total amount payable by the accused to the complainant. There is no whisper in the complaint as to how the payment towards full and final settlement was `2,67,424/- when the amount allegedly borrowed was ` 4,39,424/-. There is nothing in the complaint to show as to what happened to the balance amount of ` 1,72,000/-. In the affidavit-in-evidence also, the complainant (AW1) stated the same facts. However, a perusal of the legal notice dated 21/09/2010 given by the complainant to the accused through his Lawyer specifically states in paragraph 7 thereof that the said cheque bearing No. 299420 dated 31/08/2010 for sum of ` 2,67,424/- was given as the part payment of the total amount payable by the accused to the complainant. Therefore, there is material contradiction between the case of the complainant as pleaded in the complaint/affidavit-in-evidence and stated in the legal notice.
16. The case of the complainant was that the accused  required the money for construction of residential house i.e. for purchase of construction material. However, there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that the accused was constructing any residential house or that she had paid any bills towards the purchase of construction materials. The complainant has not produced a single receipt or acknowledgment issued by the accused for having received any amount from the complainant. In his deposition, the complainant (AW1) stated that he paid the said amount by arranging from his Savings Bank Account and by borrowing some amount from friends. He even stated the name of one of the friends as Albert Norton. The complainant, however, did not produce passbook of his Savings Bank Account or any statement of account issued by the bank to prove that he had withdrawn any money from the Savings Bank Account. The complainant also did not examine said Mr. Albert Norton to prove that he had borrowed money from him to be given to the accused. In fact, AW1 stated that he is having the statement of Bank to show the withdrawal from 05/09/2009 to 10/06/2010, but he did not produce any such statement due to which the trial Court has rightly drawn adverse inference.
17. It is pertinent to note that neither in the complaint nor in the affidavit-in-evidence the complainant stated that the  accused had paid the amount of ` 1,72,000/- and, therefore, the balance amount was ` 2,67,424/-. It is true that in the cross-examination, a suggestion was put to AW1 that the accused had paid to him a sum of ` 1,25,000/- on 02/06/2010 in front of Federal Bank, Panaji in the presence of one Ganesh Rao. However, a perusal of the cross-examination reveals that this sum of ` 1,25,000/- has nothing to do with the alleged amount of ` 4,39,424/-. A specific suggestion has been put to AW1 that his statement that the said amount of ` 1,25,000/- was paid to AW1 by the accused out of ` 4,39,424/- is a false statement. In his cross-examination, AW1 has stated that the accused had paid some amount to him and balance amount was ` 2,67,424/-. If really, the accused had paid `1,25,000/- towards the part payment of the amount of ` 4,39,424/-, then, the balance would not be ` 2,67,424/-, but would be `3,14,424/-.
18. In the circumstances above, the findings of the trial Court to the effect that the complainant failed to prove that he had advanced ` 4,39,424/- to the accused and that there was no legally enforceable debt is not erroneous. The finding of the trial Court that the accused rebutted the presumption available under the N. I. Act is also not erroneous. No glaring error has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the complainant in the CRIA19-12 12 impugned judgment and order. The impugned judgment cannot be termed as arbitrary or perverse. It is well settled that even if two views are possible out of which one is the view taken by the trial Court which is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot interfere with the same and cannot substitute the same by its own view merely because that is also a probable view. The point for determination, therefore, gets answered in the affirmative. Hence, there is no merit in the present appeal.
19. In the result, the appeal is rejected.

Leading judgment on money lending law

Leading judgment on money lending law

I shall first take up the point whether the suit itself is barred under Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (Bihar Act VII of 1939). The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:--
"4. Suit for recovery of loan only maintainable by registered money-lenders --No Court shall entertain a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such moneylender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1938 (Bihar Act 3 of 1938) at the tune when such loan was advanced ........."
Two important things are to be considered for the application of this section. The first thing is whether it is a suit for a money-lender; and secondly, whether it is for recovery of a loan. In the present case, no money was actually advanced by the plaintiff. He had to take a salami of Rs. 18,000.00 from the defendants, and the defendants had no ready money to pay the same. They, therefore, executed the mortgage bond in respect of this salami money. It is not argued on behalf of the appellant that the plain-tiff is a professional money-lender. It has been held in several cases that where money-lending is casual, then the provisions regarding registration as a moneylender do not apply, vide MANU/BH/0144/1947 : AIR 1949 Pat 400, Bhutnath Kumar v. Nilkantha, Narain Singh.
The business of money-lending imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity, and that is a test of determining whether the plaintiff is a professional money-lender. Occasional loans to relatives, friends or acquaintances do not make the lender a professional moneylender. There must be more than occasional and disconnected loans to justify a finding that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender so as to apply the bar of Section 4 of Bihar Act VII of 1939: Vide Dwarkadas Marwari v. Kalipada Dey. 1959 BLJR 145 and Lakhi Narayan Sao v. Sm. Bhagwati Kuer. MANU/BH/0103/1963 : AIR 1963 Pat. 350.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1970Pat167, 1969(17)BLJR950

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA
A.F.O.D. No. 459 of 1963
Decided On: 19.05.1969
Sanwarmal Agarwalla Vs. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anwar Ahmad and M.P. Varma , JJ.

1. This appeal has been directed against the preliminary decree passed by the Second Subordinate Judge. Dhanbad, in Title (Mortgage) Suit No. 16 of 1962 decreeing the plaintiffs suit with costs on contest against defendant No. 2 and ex parte against defendant No. 1. He directed the defendants to pay a sum of Rs. 33,882.88 paise to the plaintiff on or before the 22nd August, 1963, failing which the mortgaged property, or a sufficient portion thereof, was to be sold to satisfy the decree.
2. The case of the plaintiff, shortly stated, was that coal lands measuring 50 bighas lying in village Baromesia, P. S. Baghmara, in the district of Dhanbad, as described in Schedule "A" of the plaint, belonged to the plaintiffs. On the 31st December, 1949, both the defendants took settlement of those coal bearing lands from the plaintiff under a registered Indenture of Mining Lease, together with all inclines, quarries, houses, tools, machineries etc. This colliery was then known as "Central Sindhi Colliery", which name was subsequently changed into "South Muraidih Colliery. The defendants agreed to pay a salami of Rs. 18,000/-; but they were not in a position to pay so much in cash and so they executed a registered mortgage bond on the same date in favour of the plaintiff in consideration of the said amount of Rs. 18,000/-. Under this mortgage bond, the defendants hypothecated, by simple mortgage, the very same 50 bighas of coal lands as described in Schedule "A" of the plaint. They further agreed to pay the mortgage money to the plaintiff on or before the 30th June, 1950; and, in default thereof, the defendants made themselves liable to pay interest on the same amount at 6 p. c. p. a. from the 1st July. 1950 till realisation. In spite of repeated demands and notice, the defendants mortgagors did not pay any amount to the plaintiff, and so the plaintiff had to bring the suit for recovery of the principal amount of Rs. 18,000/-, together with interest at 6 p. c. p. a. from the 1st July to June 1962, amounting to Rs. 12.960.00. The plaintiff prayed that a mortgage decree for the above mentioned sum, together with costs and interest, pendente lite and further, be granted in his favour, and the said decretal amount be declared a charge on the leasehold coal lands. The plaintiff further prayed that, if the defendants fail to pay the decretal dues within the time fixed by the Court, the mortgaged property be put to sale and should the sale proceeds be insufficient to satisfy the decretal dues, a personal decree be passed against the defendants.
3. Both the defendants filed separate written statements. But at the time of hearing only defendant No. 2 contested the suit, and the lawyer for the defendant No. 1 endorsed "no instruction". In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. 1, it was contended that defendant No. 2 was never his adopted son; rather he was the karta of his joint family. He, along with defendant No. 2, purchased the lands in suit from one Satyaprasad Chatterjee under a registered deed of sale dated the 15th December, 1949; but when the defendants, along with other members of their families, entered into possession of the property in Suit, the plaintiff represented that he had interest in the property, and advanced a claim in respect of the said property. So, in order to buy peace and under the coercion of the plaintiff, the defendants were forced to execute the mining lease in question. The mortgage in question is without consideration, inasmuch as the very same property was also charged under the mining lease in question. According to defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 had deceived him because he stopped sending return about the income etc., In respect of the colliery in question since after May, 1949, and for this he (defendant No. 1) had brought Title Suit No. 29 of 1960 against defendant No. 2. Another plea taken was that the plaintiff was not a registered money-lender, and so the suit was not maintainable.
4. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. 2, practically the same averments were made. This defendant also contended that the mortgage bond was without consideration and was executed under undue influence and coercion. He also made out a case of payment of Rs. 11,000/- in several instalments to the plaintiff.
5. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act (Bihar Act VII of 1939); that the mortgage bond was for consideration and that the mortgage money was realisable from the defendants. As against this judgment and decree, the present appeal has been filed.
6. In this Court, two additional grounds were taken on behalf of the appellant (i) that the impugned mortgage, being in violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was inoperative; and (ii) that, after the vesting of the estates and tenures in the State of Bihar, under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, on the 1st January, 1956, the entire interest in the estate in question, including the interest of the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant, vested in the State of Bihar absolutely and free from encumbrance and, as such, a mortgage decree for sale was illegal.
7. I shall first take up the point whether the suit itself is barred under Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (Bihar Act VII of 1939). The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:--
"4. Suit for recovery of loan only maintainable by registered money-lenders --No Court shall entertain a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such moneylender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1938 (Bihar Act 3 of 1938) at the tune when such loan was advanced ........."
Two important things are to be considered for the application of this section. The first thing is whether it is a suit for a money-lender; and secondly, whether it is for recovery of a loan. In the present case, no money was actually advanced by the plaintiff. He had to take a salami of Rs. 18,000.00 from the defendants, and the defendants had no ready money to pay the same. They, therefore, executed the mortgage bond in respect of this salami money. It is not argued on behalf of the appellant that the plain-tiff is a professional money-lender. It has been held in several cases that where money-lending is casual, then the provisions regarding registration as a moneylender do not apply, vide MANU/BH/0144/1947 : AIR 1949 Pat 400, Bhutnath Kumar v. Nilkantha, Narain Singh.
The business of money-lending imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity, and that is a test of determining whether the plaintiff is a professional money-lender. Occasional loans to relatives, friends or acquaintances do not make the lender a professional moneylender. There must be more than occasional and disconnected loans to justify a finding that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender so as to apply the bar of Section 4 of Bihar Act VII of 1939: Vide Dwarkadas Marwari v. Kalipada Dey. 1959 BLJR 145 and Lakhi Narayan Sao v. Sm. Bhagwati Kuer. MANU/BH/0103/1963 : AIR 1963 Pat. 350.
8. The next point which arises for consideration in this connection is as to which party has to establish that the bar of Section 4 of the Bihar Act VII of 1939 is not applicable to the present suit. Generally speaking, the onus lies on the party which asserts a particular fact or an exception to the general rule; and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has referred to some of the cases decided by this Court, in paragraph 7 of his judgment. I need not refer to and critically examine those references; because, so far as this Court is concerned, the point is settled by a decision of the Full Bench in Srimati Fula Devi v. Mangtu Maharaj (MANU/BH/0075/1969 : 1969 Pat LJR 51 :AIR 1969 Pat 294 (FB)). After a review of various decisions concerning this point, their Lordships observed' that it must be held that the onus to prove, as a matter of law, that the suit is entertainable without registration, is on the plaintiff, in view of the bar under the first paragraph of Section 4. In view of this decision, it has to be examined whether this initial onus has been discharged by the plaintiff. Of course, in the plaint it was not stated that the plaintiff is not a professional money-lender, nor that for this transaction no registration under this Act was necessary. But, in his own evidence, the plaintiff (P. W. 2) has stated that he had no money-lending business. Learned counsel for the appellant has criticised this statement by advancing an argument to the effect that the plaintiff did not specifically say that, at the time when the mortgage bond was executed, he had no money-lending business. This statement he made on the 11th May, 1963, whereas the bond was executed on the 31st December, 1949. In my opinion, such a narrow interpretation cannot be put to this statement. The plaintiff was making this averment with reference to the objection raised on behalf of the appellant in paragraph 2 of his written statement. As a matter of fact, the defendant did not lead any oral evidence whatsoever on this point. Nobody on his behalf came to say that the plaintiff was a professional money-lender, so as to require registration under the Act. I therefore, feel no hesitation in holding that for the transaction in question the plaintiff need not have been registered under this Act.
9. Apart from this consideration, there is also another point in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. It has been argued on his behalf that this transaction does not represent a loan so as to attract the provisions of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, The term loan has been defined in Section 2 (f) of the Act, and the relevant portion runs as follows:--
" 'loan' means an advance, whether of money or in kind, on interest made by a money-lender, and shall include a transaction on a bond bearing interest executed in respect of past liability and any transaction which, in substance, is a loan ............"
Here also, the "advance" must be made by a "money-lender". It has already been held that the plaintiff is not a money-lender in the sense so as to attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, Any way, the transaction itself cannot be said to be a "loan". This mortgage bond did not bear any interest for a number of years, and then it was not executed "in respect of past liability". Both the lease and the mortgage bond were contemporaneous documents. So this amount as mentioned in the mortgage bond cannot be said to be a "loan". 'In the case of Saradindu Sekhar Bannerjee v. Lalit Mohan Mazumdar, MANU/WB/0045/1941 : AIR 1941 Cal 538, it was held that such a transaction may be said to be a "debt" at best, and further that every "debt" is not a "loan". So. on this ground also, I do not think the provisions of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1939 are attracted in the present case. In agreement with the decision of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, it must, therefore, be held that the suit by the plaintiff is not hit by Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act. 1939.
10. The second point urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that the lease itself, being in violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was void and ineffective. In my opinion, this argument does not carry any weight. Prima facie, if the lease is held to be void or inoperative, the appellant must give up possession under this lease and the property demised must revert to the lessor. It is nobody's case that any such controversy had ever arisen between the parties before the institution of this suit. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that this lease was created in violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the "1949 Rules"). This rule lays down that "the lessee may, with the previous sanction of the State Government ............ transfer his lease or any right, title or interest therein, "to a person holding a certificate of approval on payment of a fee of Rs. 100 to the State Government. . . " In 1954. a proviso was added to this rule, and it is to the effect that "no mining lease or any right, title or interest therein in respect of any mineral specified in Schedule IV shall be so transferred except with the previous approval of the Central Government." This lease was executed, as already stated, on the 31st December, 1949. The 1949 Rules came into force on and from the 25th October, 1949; but they had not been extended to the Chotanag-pur area. So, when the lease was initially executed, there was no necessity for a lessee or a sub-lessee, as in this case, to hold a certificate of approval. It has been shown to us that, under Notification No. 480-iiW-271/R, dated the 16th January, 1950 the provisions of Mines end Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (hereinafter referred to as the "1948-Act") were extended to Chotanagpur Division, under the provisions of Section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Learned counsel has argued that at least from that date the lessee must conform to the provisions of Rule 37 of the 1949 Rules. He has further argued that this leaae was registered in March, 1950, and till registration no title could pass to the lessee. He has drawn our attention to the case of Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain 5 Pat LJ 715 -- MANU/BH/0024/1920 where it was observed that where an instrument which purports to transfer title to property requires to be registered the title does not pass until registration has been effected. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has argued that this question raises investigation of facts and ought to have been raised at the earliest stage when the suit was brought in the trial court. The plaintiff could have then secured evidence to show that he had not violated the provisions of Rule 37 of the 1949 Rules. He further pointed out that Rule 37 occurs in Chapter IV of the Rules which deals with the "Grant of Mining Lease in respect of land in which the minerals belong to Government", and, in his opinion, if any rule was to be made applicable to this transaction, it must be Rule 48, which occurs in chapter V dealing with "Grant of mineral concessions by private persons." So far as the present point is concerned, both these rules are practically the same. His further argument was that it was neither a prospecting licence nor a mining lease but Is a sub-lease, so to say. In my opinion, the term, "lease" also includes a "sublease" as discussed in various case laws". But the matter is not free from doubt I may further refer to the definition of "lease" in Section 2 (1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which prescribes that "Lease" in relation to mines and minerals shall include a sub-lease or prospecting lease and an agreement to lease and sublet . . ." Under Section 4(1) of the 1948 Act (Act 53 of 1948), no mining lease was to be granted after the commencement of this Act, otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under this Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides that any mining lease granted contrary to the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be void and of no effect. The law on the subject of mines and minerals has developed from time to time in the light of experiences gained. In 1957, another Act, namely, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957), was enacted. Under Section 4 (1) of this Act. "No person shall undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or as the case may be, a mining lease, granted under this Act and the rules made thereunder: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any prospecting or mining operations undertaken in any area in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act which is in force at such commencement." Sub-section (2) lays down that "no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder". So, clearly, this Act does not lay down that any mining lease in contravention of this section shall be void altogether. Under Section 21 of this Act penalty has been provided, and it lays down that "(i) whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months. . " I may further point out that, under Section 5 of the 1948 Act powers were given to the Central Government to make rules for regulating the grant of mining leases in respect of any minerals or in any area. The Mineral Concession Rules were made by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 5 of the 1948 Act. Argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that when the lease in question was registered in March, 1950, the 1949 Rules were extended to Chotanagpur Division and so if the lessee had no certificate of approval, the lease in his favour was void. From the discussion made above, it is clear that this Act was followed by another Act on the same subject' in 1957 in which no such stringent consequences were to follow, if the lease was not in conformity with the provisions of Rule 37 or Rule 48 of the 1949 Rules. Moreover, under Section 31 of the 1957 Act, the Central Government was authorised to relax the rules in special cases. No doubt, by Section 29 of the 1957 Act all rules made or purporting to have been made under the Act of 1948 were to be deemed to have been made in the 1957 Act and which were not inconsistent therewith. In other words, all existing rules were to continue when the 1957 Act came in force, though the 1948 Act was repealed by the 1957 Act (Vide paragraph 6 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/SC/0028/1966 : AIR 1967 SC 887). On a consideration therefore, of these various rules and the provisions of the 1948 and 1957 Acts, referred to above, I am not inclined to hold that this plea, which has been raised on behalf of the appellant, is available to him.
11. The third argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that, with the vesting of the estate, in which these mineral areas lie in the State of Bihar, the old lease came to an end and a new statutory lease came into being, as provided under Section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. If the mines were worked directly by the intermediary when the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 came into force, the provisions of Section 9 of the Act would apply. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of MANU/SC/0028/1966 : AIR 1967 SC 887. There was a difference of opinion amongst the learned Judges, but the majority view was that the old lease came to an end and a new statutory lease came into effect. I may quote the following lines: (P. 891).
"The effect of the estate being deemed to be leased by the State Government is that the erstwhile lessee of the intermediary becomes actually the lessee of the State Government for all purposes from the date of the vesting of the estate in the State. He cannot be deemed to be a lessee of the intermediary whose title is lost under the original lease."
In that case the point at issue was whether the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956 were applicable to the mining leases in question. Of course, the minority view was that Section 10 continues the lease which was subsisting on the date of vesting. The terms and conditions of the lease are modified and the Government is substituted as lessor in place of the proprietor or tenure-holder. In other respects the old lease continues. Anyway, following the majority view, it must be held that the old lease which was created on the 31st December, 1949, came to an end on the date of vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar and a new statutory lease came into effect.
12. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has argued that this is a new point which has been taken for the first tune in this court in appeal and so it should be left out of consideration. In my opinion, this argument cannot be allowed to prevail, because, to resolve this question, no additional evidence, either documentary or oral, was required. It is purely a question of law, namely, the effect on the lease because of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. This question relates to that part of the decree which indicates that a charge shall be created on the mortgaged property which shall be sold for the liquidation of the debt and that the plaintiff would be also entitled to a personal decree if the charged property proved insufficient to satisfy the dues. Under Section 4 (a) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act estates and tenures shall, "with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interests in such estate or tenure, other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provision of this Act." The interests of the proprietor or, tenure-holder in all sub-soils, including any rights in mines and minerals, are to vest in the State Government. In this view of the legal position, the remedy available to the plaintiff is not to enforce the mortgage bond and secure satisfaction of his debt by sale of the mortgaged property. His remedy is to follow the compensation in the first instance and then look forward as to what consequences would follow in future. As held in the case of Rajkishore Prasad Narayan Singh v. Ram Pratap Pandey (MANU/SC/0032/1966 : 1967 B. L. J. R. 331 :AIR 1967 SC 801) the remedy of such a mortgagee is to follow the compensation as well as the non-vested property of the proprietor for the satisfaction of his mortgage dues.
13. No other point was raised before us.
14. In the result, the judgment and decree of the court below are upheld and the appeal is dismissed with this modification only that the decretal dues will not be a charge on the mortgaged property and the same shall not be sold for the satisfaction of the mortgage dues. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this Court,